INTRODUCTION
This essay critically analyzes the bizarre bifurcation afflicting Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. 1 The National Labor Relations Board and various circuit courts of appeals have created a pernicious false dichotomy, holding that employees injured at work who invoke state law 2 workers compensation benefits are not engaging in NLRA Section 7 concerted, protected activities. Thus, retaliatory actions by vindictive employers against injured employees asserting workers compensation claims pursuant to state law are not prohibited by the NLRA. Meanwhile, employees who complain of unsafe 3 or unhealthy working conditions continue to be properly regarded by the Board and the courts of appeals as within the ambit of Section 7. Consequently, employer retaliation against such employees engaging in Section 7 concerted, protected activities of reporting unsafe, unhealthy working conditions to federal or state or local agencies would constitute employer unfair labor practices in violation of the NLRA. The Board, the courts of appeals, and, ultimately, the Supreme Court must restore NLRA Section 7 1 29 USC 157. 2 Workers compensation insurance operates as a matter of largely state statutory law, and provides for monetary benefits, medical benefits, and rehabilitation for employees injured arising out of or in the course of their employment. Worker's compensation is a no-fault system in lieu of jury trials, making employers strictly liable to accidentally injured employees, without regard to negligence of the employee or the employer. New York State, with 8.6 million workers, has approximately 150,000 workers compensation claims annually filed by injured workers. In 1911, the New York Court of Appeals pronounced the New York State workers compensation law unconstitutional, depriving employers of their property without due process of law. Ives v. South Buffalo Railroad, 21 N.Y. 271, 317 (1911 
---"An injury to one is an injury to all!"
The collective, communitarian principle at the heart of Section 7 has been cruelly transmogrified into the ruthlessly Darwinistic law of the (super) capitalist 12 jungle---"every man for himself!" For injured employees trapped in this bleak scenario, misery is virtually guaranteed, exacerbated by the unavailability of the protections of Section 7 of the NLRA. considers the parameters of Section 7, the Court has never directly addressed, let alone definitively resolved, this specific issue, although the divorce from Section 7 protections of injured workers exercising state workers compensation statutory rights has been unequivocally, if summarily, pronounced by United States Courts of Appeals in several circuits, as well as by the National Labor Relations Board.
The NLRB and the federal courts of appeals have withdrawn the Section 7 protections in summary, cursory fashion, without furnishing any rationale of any depth or significance. Rather, there has been a reflexive implicit deference to radical Jeffersonian states' rights federalism by judicial fiat, without examining the pernicious ramifications that the deprivation of Section 7 protections ineluctably have for injured, vulnerable employees.
In a two-step of judicial jujitsu, the Board and the courts of appeals first engage in the blatant legal fiction that the injured employee's invocation of state workers compensation law statutory rights is a purely individual act, not a concerted, protected activity within the meaning of Section 7. This is a particularly poignant repudiation of labor reality. It is also exquisitely ironic, since much of labor solidarity and collective consciousness was catalyzed by the horrific loss of life among largely immigrant young women workers in the notorious Shirtwaist Triangle factory fire in Manhattan nearly a century ago. 13 The disaster was the social catalyst spurring enactment of state workers compensation laws throughout the nation.
DAVE VON DREHLE, TRIANGLE: THE FIRE THAT CHANGED AMERICA (Thorndike Press, 2004).
Under the dichotomized Section 7 regime today, a factory girl reporting a fire hazard at a contemporary sweatshop would, at least theoretically, be protected against employer retaliation by Section 7. But, if she were injured while physically removing the fire hazard, filed for workers compensation, and was retaliated against by the employer because she filed for workers compensation, she would not be protected by Section 7. Court of Appeals, however, overruled the NLRB, refused to order enforcement of the NLRB's decision, and used the opportunity to disavow Section 7's applicability in the state workers compensation context. 15 The court held that an employee filing a claim was not engaging in a "concerted activity," and that the NLRB's efforts to create a concerted activity were manifestly wrong. "Our circuit has indicated that the term 'concerted activity' means that the employee must be acting 'with or on behalf of other employees, and not solely by and on behalf of the discharged employee himself….. The
Board in effect concedes that there is no evidence that the action of the solitary employee in this case intended or contemplated any group activity or that he was 'in fact acting on behalf of or as representative of, other employees;' at most his action can be said to have been 'for the benefit of other employees only in a theoretical sense." The court summarily declared: " The conduct at issue in this case-discharge of workers because they pursued workers compensation claims-is not subject to either protection or prohibition by the National Labor Relations Act because it has nothing whatsoever to do with union organization and collective bargaining.Likewise, the underlying activity that provoked the conduct complained of-that is, the filing of worker's compensation claims under state law-has no tendency to conflict with the National Labor Relations Act or the federal law. Even if discharges related to workmen's compensation claims were covered by federal law, the discharges would more likely be prohibited than protected. It is inconceivable that there would be state court interference with federal labor policy in connection with the present type of statute… The activity present in the case before us bears little resemblance to that found to be federally protected… there has been no special congressional consideration of worker's compensation related discharges.
Moreover, discharging workers because they have filed claims has nothing to do with collective bargaining. It cannot be classed as an essential aspect of the economic forces which enter into the shaping of viable labor agreements… there is one other exception that we have discussed… that is the tenuous relationship between the federal labor laws of the remedy that is here being challenged. In other words, the concern of the federal labor laws is, to say the least, peripheral and tenuous."
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In 1985, the Tenth Circuit reinforced its summary conclusion in Dollar, reiterating that the employer's dismissal of employees filing workers compensation claims is not prohibited by the NLRA. Peabody, the filing of workers' compensation claims was viewed by the court of appeals as only a "peripheral" concern of the NLRA. 23 As such, the Oklahoma state law regulating the issue was not preempted, and the filing of claims was held not to be an NLRA protected activity.
The Garmon labor preemption doctrine has thus been transmogrified into a blunt instrument antithetical to workers rights. It presents a stark "either or" dilemma--- Unfortunately, the current legal regime does not recognize that injured employees manifestly deserve the integrated protections of both Section 7 of the NLRA and of the state workers compensation law, just as employees reporting unsafe conditions have the protection of Section 7 of the NLRA and of the various federal, state, and local laws designed to insure safe workplaces. Meaningful federalism should eschew the radical "either or" jurisprudential choice of either only Section 7 or only state workers compensation law exclusively governing the field, and instead endorse an integrated regime of federal and state law protections.
The Reagan Board repeatedly slammed the door on injured workers in communication with state workers compensation offices. One need not file for benefits; apparently, according to the Reagan Board, simply speaking with the state law workers compensation regime is sufficient to fall outside the ambit of Section 7. Prior to the enactment in 1970 of the now-cornerstone federal law regarding workplace safety and health, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the N.L.R.B. had long held that an employee's filing of health complaints was protected activity under 25 The NLRB has consistently held that employee complaints to OSHA are protected concerted Section 7 activities. See, for example, Systems with Reliability Inc., 322 NLRB No. 132 (1996) (" The Company discharged Yuhas because he engaged in concerted activity protected under Section 7 of the Act. The action which precipitated Yuhas' discharge, i.e., his statement that he would complain to OSHA, was one step in the concerted efforts of the three welders to improve safety and health conditions in the workplace. By saying that he would contact OSHA, Yuhas engaged in concerted activity for the purpose of mutual aid and protection; protected under Section 7 of the Act. held that filing a complaint under OSHA was Section 7 concerted protected activity.
27
The evolution of the law following the N.L.R.B.'s decision in Alleluia was tumultuous, as best. Six years later, the Board overruled its Alleluia decision. In Meyers Industries, the Board resurrected an "objective" test for defining Section 7 concerted activities that existed before Alleluia. 28 This standard maintains that an employee's activity is concerted only if the activity is "engaged in with or on the authority of other employees, and not solely by and on behalf of the employee himself." The development of this area of law was, to say the least, less than linear. Ultimately, however, the NLRB continues to hold that the worker's exercise of the federal OSHA statutory right to file a safety or health claim under OSHA is Section 7 protected activity. Industries, Inc., 281 NLRB No. 118, 882 (1986) 35 Id. 36 Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987 37 Stevens Construction Co., NLRB (June, 2007) . 38 T. Steele Constr., Inc. and Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 150, AFL-CIO, 348 NLRB No. 79 (2007) . See also, In re U. S. Postal Service, 338 NLRB No. 160 (2003) "[T] he Respondent may not lawfully seize upon an incident…to retaliate against one for engaging in activity protected by Section 7 of the Act, such as filing an OSHA complaint."; In re West Virginia Steel Corp.,337 NLRB No. 3 (2001) ; Systems with Reliability, Inc., 322 NLRB No. 132 (1996) ("By saying that he would contact OSHA, Yuhas engaged in concerted activity for the purpose of mutual aid and protection… he engaged in concerted activity protected under Section 7 of the Act")
complaining to OSHA about the Respondent's safety practices, and was contemplating making further such complaints." The most outrageous consequence of the bizarre bifurcation of Section 7 is the NLRB's refusal to extend Section 7 protections to employees who complain of sexual harassment.
39 T. Steele Constr., Inc., 348 NLRB No. 79 at 20. 40 Mike Yurosek & Sons, Inc., 306 NLRB 1037 , 1038 (1992 . 41 Holling Press, 343 NLRB No. 45 (2004) (Member Liebman, Dissenting) The emergent recent trend is that filing a discrimination complaint with the EEOC or state or local human rights agency is not protected under Section 7, especially when it is undertaken by an employee whom the NLRB regards as acting only for her own individual benefit. It was not always so. In Hotel and Restaurant Employees, the Board held in 1980 that filing a sexual discrimination claim with the state employment commission was protected under the N.LR.A. 42 This is especially so when the employee can also point to a fair employment practices provision in the collective bargaining agreement.
43 the complainant only sought to benefit herself. 45 The Board held that her activity "was not engaged in for the purposes of mutual aid or protection." 46 The NLRB characterized Ms. Fabozzi's conduct as purely self interested , without any concern for the wellbeing of fellow employees. The Board found that it was entirely too speculative and remote to presume that Ms. Garcia might, at some future point, suffer an injury and turn to Ms.
Farbozzi for help.
This plainly denies the reality of the dynamics of sexual harassment in the workplace, and leaves every employee subject to unlawful harassment without the protections of Section 7. As Member Liebman forcefully stated in her pointed dissent:
"The majority sets an arbitrary standard, at odds with what our case law contemplates. It treats sexual harassment at work as merely an individual concern, even when victims seek help from coworkers. That view is simply unacceptable… As a recent study observed, "sexual harassment is a fact of life for many working women, with some studies suggesting that work-related sexual harassment may affect as many as one in two women at some point in the work lives. This crabbed reasoning flows from an unnaturally narrow view of the N.R.L.A.
The Board reasons that a workers compensation claim only benefits a single employee, and accordingly, precludes the application of the N.L.R.A. However, this ignores the underlying reality compelling the employee to file for workers compensation in the first place. Quite often, the stimulus that required the employee to file for workers 48 Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 901 F.Supp. 1541 (1994 ), aff'd, 53 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 1995 49 Id.
compensation, such as unsafe, unhealthy working conditions and management exploitation and intimidation of vulnerable workers, will constitute the unfair labor practices that the N.L.R.A. was designed to prevent; to preclude Section 7 protections for the employee undermines the very purpose of the N.L.R.A.
Eventually, the United States Supreme Court must definitively resolve the bizarre bifurcation of Section 7, expressly repudiate the NLRB and lower courts' decisions that have removed from the scope of Section 7 workers compensation and discrimination complaints, and restore Section 7 protections to all individual employee initiatives.
The Court need only reaffirm the essence of its classic decision in 1984 in NLRB v. City Disposal Systems Inc,. 50 which, in turn, was premised on the Court's broad and integrated reading of Section 7 concerted protected activities in Eastex,, Inc. v. NLRB, . 51 recognizing that employees who supported enhanced federal minimum wage laws for other workers would themselves indirectly benefit in future contract negotiations, as any legislative increase in minimum wages for low wage workers would raise the floor from which the higher wage workers could bargain for proportionately greater wage increases from their particular employer.
To maintain the protections of Section 7 of the NLRA for employees who individually resort to external agencies with complaints of unlawful discrimination, for 50 465 U. S. 822 (1984) . 51 437 U. S. 556 (1978) , But see, Harrah's Lake Tahoe Resort Casino, 307 NLRB 182 (1982) (Board found against employees asserting 8a1 unfair labor practices by the employer hotel casino, which prohibited employees from distributing literature about Employee Stock Ownership Plan proposals without first being approved for distribution by the employer.
example, it is imperative that the individual employee accentuate the relevant language of the pertinent collective bargaining agreement that prohibits unlawful discrimination.
Otherwise, in the wake of the NLRB's 2004 decision in Holling Press, it is likely that the NLRB will not accord Section 7 protections to individuals retaliated against for filing employment discrimination allegations with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, or state or local equivalent agencies.
Alexander Dumas' Musketeers subscribed to the axiomatic principle of "All for One, and One for All." In the early twentieth century, this truth was reaffirmed by the Wobblies' cry that "An injury to one is an injury to all." Well, apparently not so, say the current NLRB and some of the more brittle, rigid circuit courts of appeals, with their atomized Darwinistic law of the jungle ethos of every man for himself, further isolating the most vulnerable injured and harassed workers. Accordingly, after three decades of decisions by the N.L.R.B and the circuit courts vitiating the Section 7 rights of employees who pursue workers compensation claims, it will take a decision by the Supreme Court to restore those Section 7 protections to employees injured at work.
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